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The Seven Billion Dollar Gray Market:
Trademark Infringement or Honest
Competition?
In 1984, over seven billion dollars worth of gray market goods were
imported into the the United States.' Gray market goods are goods
produced by a foreign manufacturer which bear the manufacturer's
trademark.2 Gray market goods are purchased abroad legally.3 They
are sold, however, in competition with goods marketed by the of-
ficial United States distributor.4 The official distributor claims to own
the right to be the exclusive distributor of the goods in the United
States. Therefore, the unexpected competition from the gray market
has resulted in numerous lawsuits initiated by domestic mark holders
to exclude- gray market goods from the United States.5
The gray market has become increasingly popular with the American
consumer. 6 Furthermore, the gray market promises to become even
more popular as consumers discover that they can purchase anything
from cars to cameras at prices far below those domestic mark holders
command.7 In 1980, over 1,500 cars were imported into the United
States through the gray market.' Four years later that number in-
creased to 48,000. 9 This dramatic increase illustrates the surge in
popularity of gray market goods. A typical example of the cost sav-
ings of gray market goods is a Mercedes Benz 500 that costs more
than $53,000 in a United States showroom can be purchased in Ger-
many for about $30,000, shipped to the United States for about $2,000,
1. Westerman, The $7 Billion Gray Market: Where it Stops, Nobody Knows, Bus. Wk.,
April 15, 1985, at 86 (gray market goods account for almost six percent of the trade deficit).
2. See, e.g., Veil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Bernard Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 702 (D.C.N.J.
1985) (gray market goods are also referred to as parallel imports).
3. Id.
4. The official distributor is the owner of the United States trademark. See id.
5. See infra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
6. McAlevey, The Perils of a Gray Market, Newsweek, Jan. 28, 1985, at 56.
7. Id. In 1980, according to the Environmental Protection Agency, 1,500 cars were im-
ported into the United States through the gray market. This year the Environmental Protection
Agency estimates that 100,000 cars will be imported through the gray market. Id.
8. Seamonds, If You Buy a Car on the "Gray Market," U.S. News & World Rep., March
18, 1985, at 49.
9. Id. See also Blinken, The Mercedes Relief Act, New Republic, June 3, 1985, at 13
(22,000 out of 100,000 Mercedes Benzs sold in the United States in 1984 were from the gray
market).
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and modified to meet federal standards for about $5,000. t° The net
result is a cost savings of more than $16,000." One can see why the
gray market is booming.2
Domestic mark holders'3 claim that the sale of gray market goods
violates federal trademark law"' because domestic mark holders have
exclusive territorial rights to sell their products.' 5 Furthermore, con-
sumers identify the products with the domestic mark holder.' 6 When
a gray market product is defective or damaged and no warranty is
available to cover the claim, the reputation of the domestic mark holder
suffers.' 7 In lieu of a damaged reputation, domestic mark holders
often voluntarily incur the cost of repair.'8 Finally, domestic mark
holders complain that gray market importers are taking a free ride
on the advertising expenses that the domestic owner has incurred to
promote the product.' 9
Gray market importers claim domestic mark holders are violating
antitrust laws by claiming exclusive territory rights.2" An exclusive ter-
10. McAlevey, supra note 6, at 56.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Domestic mark holders are the owners of the rights to distribute a particular product
in the United States. Having a domestic mark holder helps the foreign manufacturers facilitate
the distribution process because domestic buyers might be reluctant to purchase foreign goods
which are not supported by a local company. Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray
Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Cosup. LAW 231, 236 (1984).
14. Federal trademark law allows the holder of a mark to prevent others from copying
or simulating that mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). The law protects three distinct interests.
(1) The consumer's desire to get particular goods in a condition in which can be relied upon;
(2) The trademark owner's interest in maintaining the goodwill of the business; and (3) the
public policy in favor of free competition. Note, Trademark Infringement: The Power of an
American Trademark Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufac-
tured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 561 (1955).
15. Theoretically, when a foreign owner of a trademark sells the rights to distribute the
product in the United States to the domestic mark holder, the foreign owner promises not
to sell to any other distributors in the United States. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 235.
Therefore, the domestic mark holder claims to have the exclusive right to market the product.
See id. Once the United States distributor has purchased the right to use the trademark in
the United States, the distributor registers the trademark and can invoke the protection of federal
trademark law. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
16. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 236.
17. Id. at 234. Consumers do not always know they are buying a product that is not
supplied by the authorized distributor in the United States. Therefore, the goodwill of the domestic
mark holder suffers when consumers are dissatisfied. See also McAlevey, supra note 6, at 56
("They're not going to say 'My gray market Mercedes is a lemon.').
18. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
19. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 235. In 1981, eight well known watch companies
involved in importing watches through authorized distribution channels spent about 50 million
dollars on advertising in the United States. Id. at 235 n.18. See also Victor, Preventing Impor-
tation of Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 ANTiTRusT L.J. 783, 790 (1984).
20. See generally United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958) (three United States toiletry companies were charged
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ritory theoretically allows domestic mark holders to inflate the price
of the product because intrabrand competition 2 is eliminated.
22 If
the domestic mark holder is able to exclude the gray market goods,
the price charged by the domestic mark holder is sure to increase.2"
In addition to the antitrust violations, gray market importers claim
that when the foreign manufacturer and the enterprise which owns
the domestic mark are owned or controlled by the same people, no
need exists to exclude the imports because the actual owners2" of the
trademark have already made a profit from the initial sale of the
product.25
Gray market goods have generated controversy in this country since
the 1923 decision in Bourjois v. Katzel.26 In Bourjois, the United States
Supreme Court first recognized the territoriality view 27 of trademark
protection by allowing a perfume company that owned a domestic
trademark to exclude the importation of gray market perfume. 21 Six-
ty years later in Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Ser-
vice, 29 a federal district court applied the universality view and ruled
that the domestic mark holder could not exclude the importation of
gray market perfume bearing an identical trademark.30
This confusion in the courts has been paralleled by attempts of
various governmental bodies to resolve the gray goods issue. Con-
with violating antitrust laws when they invoked trademark laws to exclude competition from
the gray market). See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
21. Intrabrand competition is the competition between wholesale or retail distributors of
the same product from a common manufacturer. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
22. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 233. If gray market goods were excluded from
the United States, the domestic market would be insulated from intrabrand price competition.
As a result, consumers would have to pay an artificially high price. Id.
23. United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
24. The actual owner of the trademark in this situation is the foreign manufacturer. Par-
fums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 417-19 (S.D.Fla. 1983).
Although the domestic mark holder is often incorporated under another name, the foreign
manufacturer owns or controls the corporation. Therefore, once the foreign supplier has sold
the product to the gray market importer, the actual owners of the domestic trademark have
already made a profit from the sale. Consequently, the domestic mark holder cannot be hurt
by a sale lost to the gray market. See generally id. (because the plaintiff was a cog in a single
international enterprise, he had no right to exclude the gray market goods from importation).
25. See id. (the profit is made when the foreign manufacturer sells to the gray market
importer).
26. 260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923).
27. The territoriality principle is based upon the notion that a trademark has a separate
legal identity in each country which symbolizes the reputation and goodwill of the domestic
mark holder. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171. In contrast, the universality view only recognizes
the single reputation and goodwill of the manufacturer. This view originated from the idea
that trademarks were merely marks to indicate origin. Id.
28. Bourjois, 260 U.S. at 691.
29. 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
30. Id. at 421.
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gress enacted legislation to regulate gray market imports.3' This legisla-
tion has been the primary source of relief for the domestic mark
holder.32 The Bureau of Customs, however, has changed position on
which gray market goods to exclude from importation no less than
four times." The changes at the Bureau of Customs are attributable
to attempts to follow the direction set by both Congress and the
Supreme Court." The resulting confusion has caused two district courts
confronted with similar factual situations to come to opposite con-
clusions. 31
Initially, this comment will discuss the numerous factors that con-
tribute to the fertility of the gray market. 36 This comment will then
examine the burdens and benefits of the gray market to the American
consumer.17 Next, the development of the gray goods issue in both
the courts and Congress will be addressed. 38 Finally, this comment
will conclude that current uncertainties in the law should be resolved
in favor of allowing the importation of gray market goods. 9 The
imports, however, should be subject to certain restrictions in order
to protect the American consumer, and to protect the integrity of
the domestic mark holder.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GRAY MARKET
The predominant factor that contributes to the gray market is fluc-
tuation of currency exchange rates. 0 When the dollar is strong in
foreign markets, the gray market becomes active.' Gray market im-
porters can buy trademarked goods from wholesalers overseas and
import them at a lower cost than the domestic mark holder who pur-
chases directly from the manufacturer. 2 The domestic mark holder
does not always have the luxury of buying when the dollar is strong
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
32. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165.
33. Vivitar Corporation v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566-67 (1985).
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 178-202 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 80-147 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
40. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 232 (the gray market has been compared to the com-
modity exchange because gray market dealers watch foreign exchange rates and then traffic
the gray goods accordingly).
41. Baldo, Score One for the Gray Market, Forbes, Feb. 25, 1985, at 74. (when the United
States dollar is strong, retailers find that they can buy United States trademarked goods cheaper
overseas and bring them back for resale in the United States).
42. Id.
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because a steady supply of merchandise must be maintained at a stable
price.43 Goods must be purchased as the need arises, otherwise, the
domestic mark holder will face adverse competitive effects." Therefore,
the domestic mark holder often purchases goods when the dollar is
weak. The gray market importer, however, monitors the currency rates
and purchases the goods when the dollar is strong.45 The result is
that the gray market importer who purchases with a strong dollar
will obtain more goods per dollar than the exclusive distributor who
purchases with a weaker dollar.
46
Another major factor contributing to the higher price charged by
domestic mark holders is the cost of goodwill. 7 The domestic mark
holder often spends millions of dollars on advertising to promote pro-
ducts. 8 In addition, domestic mark holders may provide warranty
coverage, product liability insurance, rebates, seminars, dealer train-
ing, and often carry an exhaustive supply of inventory to meet the
needs of customers. 49 The relative inability of the domestic mark holder
to monitor exchange rates, coupled with advertising expenses and the
need to offer peripheral services explains why the domestic mark holder
must charge a higher price for imported products than the gray market
importer.
The difficult issue to be resolved in the gray market controversy
is whether the domestic mark holder should be able to invoke
trademark and unfair trade practice laws in order to maintain the
higher price. A look at the benefits and burdens of the gray market
will demonstrate that the concerns of the domestic mark holders can
be alleviated by placing a notice label on gray market goods.50
BENEFITS AND BURDENS IN THE GRAY MARKET
The primary benefit to American consumers from the gray market
is the opportunity to purchase products at significantly lower prices.5
The lower cost is attributable partially to a lower overhead expense
43. Supnik, The Bell and Howell: Mamiya Case-Where Now Parallel Imports?, 74 TRADE-
MARX REP. 1, 2 n.7 (1983).
44. Id.
45. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 232.
46. Id.
47. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166. In Osawa, the plaintiff incurred many public relations
expenses related to the providing of rebates, seminars, and free peripheral equipment. Id.
48. See Baldo, supra note 41, at 74 (the Duracell division of Dart & Kraft Inc. spent
$150 million over the past three years to promote Duracell batteries).
49. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166.
50. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
51. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 233.
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incurred by the gray market importer.12 In addition, when the gray
market is active, the resulting intrabrand competition drives down the
price charged by the domestic mark holder." The gray market con-
sumer will be discouraged, however, to discover that no warranty is
available to cover the product."4 An expectation of warranty coverage
is justifiable because the gray market consumer normally is introduced
to the product through advertisement by the domestic mark holder
who often provides a warranty."
Other problems gray market consumers encounter include purchas-
ing substandard goods.5 6 Gray market goods often are damaged or
not in compliance with United States safety, ingredient control, or
labeling requirements." Furthermore, gray market goods occasionally
have been found incompatable with United States weights, measure,
or specifications, and some have been found to be obsolete. 8 Any
disappointment incurred by American consumers due to purchases on
the gray market normally will be reflected in damage to the reputa-
tion of the domestic mark holder. 9 When the consumer discovers
the product has no warranty coverage, or the product is somehow
defective, the goodwill60 of the domestic mark holder is damaged.
To protect the goodwill of a business, the owner may be forced to
warranty products sold by gray market importers.6' Warranty coverage
is a cost of doing business that is reflected in the price charged to
52. See id. at 235. The gray market importers take a free ride on the overhead of the
domestic mark holder. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
54. Consumer discouragement results in dissatisfaction with the product and, therefore,
the goodwill of the company is damaged. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 233.
55. Consumers often do not know that they are buying gray market goods. Therefore,
they expect to get the services offered by the domestic mark holder. Id. at 234.
56. See Baldo, supra note 41, at 74 (gray market Duracell batteries are not fresh when
sold in the United States).
57. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 233 (many gray market goods are not regulated by
the inspection, transit and quality controls used to monitor goods earmarked for the domestic
mark holder).
58. Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 AN-
TrrRUST L.J. 783, 791 (1984) (goods not in compliance with the standards of the domestic
mark holder or the United States weights and measures seriously injure the business of the
domestic mark holder).
59. The domestic mark holder cannot exercise control over the substandard goods im-
ported by the gray market importers. As a result, the reputation of the domestic mark holder
suffers. Id. at 791.
60. Shely, Discrimination Against Foreign Owners of U.S. Trademarks Under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526, 18 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 423, 425 n.16 (1984) (goodwill is a business value
that reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has of-
fered goods and services that the customer likes and has found adequate).
61. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166 (the domestic mark holder may be forced to war-
ranty a gray market good in order to save goodwill).
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the consumer.62 If the domestic mark holder is forced to warranty
products that were sold by others, profits will decrease as warranty
costs increase.6 3
Another concern of domestic mark holders is that consumers will
go to United States distributors and test products in the showroom. 6"
After the desired product is selected, however, the consumer purchases
the product on the gray market.6 5 The time and money expended by
the domestic mark holder on advertising and showroom displays has
resulted in a direct benefit to the gray market importer.6 6 Finally,
the most significant effect of a gray market sale is that the domestic
mark holder loses a potential sale.67 If enough sales are lost, the
distributor may be forced to reduce the sales staff.68
A notice label stating who is actually selling the gray market good,
and explaining that the product does not carry a warranty would solve
many of the problems created by the gray market. 9 Much of the
damage to the goodwill of the domestic mark holder would be
alleviated with a notice label because the consumer would be less likely
to associate the defective gray market product with the domestic mark
holder.70 A notice label would not remedy the problem of lost sales
to the domestic mark holder. Protecting domestic mark holders from
lost sales, however, is not the purpose of United States trademark
laws. 7' Therefore, the exclusion of gray market goods with a notice
label would not be warranted.72
The primary purpose of trade laws in the United States is to foster
open competition. 73 Open competition drives prices down and ulti-
mately benefits consumers. 7 An overriding public policy, however,
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1167.
64. Ramirez, Blue v. Gray: IBM Tries to Stop the Discounters, Fortune, May 27, 1985,
at 79 (owner of computer chain complains that cistomers intent on buying on the gray market
consume hours of legitimate dealers' time scouting out the product).
65. See id.
66. Victor, supra note 58, at 790 (gray market importers are taking a free ride on the
goodwill and efforts of the domestic mark holder).
67. Recently, a camera dealer attributed a 60% reduction in sales staff to the importation
of gray market cameras. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 233 (citing Brief for Appellee at 33
n.8, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983)).
68. Id.
69. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
70. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
71. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 235.
72. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
73. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 235.
74. Id. Open competition cannot be devoid of legal restraints. Otherwise, many competitors
would be inhibited from entering the market due to unfair competition. Presently, United States
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is to avoid destructive competition without discouraging legitimate and
productive competition.7" With respect to legitimate competition, a
trademark76 preserves three distinct interests. These three interests are:
(1) the consumer's desire to get particular goods in a reliable condi-
tion; (2) the trademark owner's interest in maintaining the good will
of the business; and (3) the public policy in favor of free competition. 7
The first interest, commonly referred to as identification, was a
significant factor in the development of trademark laws in the United
States. 78 Consequently, courts focus upon the likelihood of consumer
confusion in identifying the source of the product to determine whether
a trademark has been infringed. 79 The rationale for focusing upon
consumer confusion is that when consumers are confused as to the
actual source of the product, consumers are likely to direct any
dissatisfaction to the domestic mark holder.80 Consumers are less likely
to be confused if gray market goods are labelled with a notice of
their origin. Therefore, total exclusion of gray market goods would
be unwarranted if a notice label existed because the interests of con-
sumers would be adequately protected.
A. Initial Judicial Consideration
An examination of the historical development of the law governing
the gray market indicates that the total exclusion of gray market goods
is unwarranted. The controversy in the courts concerning the gray
market began in the early 1900's. The controversy centered around
the territoriality view of trademark law as opposed to the universal-
ity view. The universality view is concerned with the single reputa-
tion of the manufacturer because of the belief that a trademark is
law provides remedies for espionage, misappropriation of trade secrets, patent infringement,
copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and other tortious acts amounting to unfair
competition. Id.
75. Epstein, Interference with Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation, 18 STAN. L.
RE,. 1406 (1966).
76. The term trademark includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others. 74 AM. JUR. 2d Trademarks and Tradenames
§ 1 (1974). Exclusive rights to use a trademark are granted by the federal government. Id. § 10.
77. Note, Trademark Infringement: The Power of an American Trademark Owner to Pre-
vent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALe
L.J. 557, 561 (1955).
78. See Callmann, Another Look at the Unlawful Importation of Trademarked Articles,
52 TR.ADE-MA su REP". 556, 557 (federal protection is granted if the use of the trademark by
one other than the authorized dealer is likely to cause consumer confusion).
79. Id. at 557-58.
80. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 235.
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merely an indicator of origin.8 In contrast, the territoriality view
recognizes that a trademark has a separate legal identity in each country
and the trademark symbolizes the reputation of the domestic mark
holder.82 In 1921, in Bourjois v. Katzel,83 a United States company
purchased the business and trademark from a French company that
produced face powder.84 The defendant purchased the powder from
the same manufacturer in Europe and attempted to sell the powder
in the United States. The appellate court held that the universality
view of trademarks should apply.8 5 The court concluded trademark
infringement could not exist when the imported goods were properly
trademarked.8 6 The Supreme Court,87 however, reversed the appellate
court and held the territoriality view of trademarks 8 should apply.8"
The court applied the territoriality view because the foreign manufac-
turer and the domestic mark holder were separate and unrelated en-
tities. 90 The court concluded that the foreign manufacturer would be
able to take an unfair advantage of the domestic mark holder under
the universality view. 91
Before the Supreme Court ruled on the Bourjois case, Congress
enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.92 The section provides
for the exclusion of all imports that are branded with trademarks
owned by a United States citizen, corporation, or association if the
trademark is registered and recorded with the United States Customs
Office for import protection.93 Many domestic mark holders have in-
voked section 526 to protect themselves from gray market imports.94
The Bureau of Customs, however, has restricted section 526 severely
by adopting exceptions in the implementing regulations for companies
owned or controlled by foreign manufacturers. 95 Critics of courts allow-
81. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163.
82. Id.
83. 275 F. 539 (1921).
84. Id.
85. Id. (court did not actually refer to the universality view, but the view is apparent
from the context).
86. Id. at 543.
87. Bourjois v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. Bourjois, 260 U.S. at 692 (court did not actually refer to the territoriality view, but
the view is apparent from the context).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 691.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
93. Id.
94. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163; Seiko Time Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q.
560 (1982).
95. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1557 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Guerlain,
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ing domestic mark holders to invoke section 526 argue that section
526 was enacted in response to Bourjois and should be limited to
the facts of that case. 96
Customs regulations presently allow the owner of a United States
trademark to exclude from importation all genuinely marked goods
if the United States trademark owner is independent from the foreign
manufacturer.97 The goods will be excluded whether or not the owner
has established an independent reputation for the trademark.98 Sec-
tion 526, as interpreted by Customs, gives independent domestic mark
holders an intrabrand monopoly on the American market by enforc-
ing the domestic mark holder's right to be the sole distributor of the
product in the United States.99 In apparent contradiction to section
526, however, the regulations do not give the same protection to
domestic mark holders who are owned or controlled by a foreign
manufacturer.' 0
Two reasons have been given for limiting protection under section
526 to independent mark holders.' 0 ' First, to allow a foreign manufac-
turer to take advantage of section 526 would allow foreign manufac-
turers to exclude goods from the United States that were purchased
from the manufacturer's own plant.'02 As a result, the foreign
manufacturer could prevent competition from wholesale gray market
buyers and domestic mark holders. Eventually, the foreign manufac-
turer could develop an international monopoly."'° Therefore, if the
entity that owns the trademark is owned or controlled by a common
person or corporation, gray market goods will not be excluded from
the United States.' 4 This statutory interpretation comports with the
view of many commentators that the Congressional intent behind the
155 F. Supp. at 82 (judge said he was not persuaded that the intention of Congress was to
grant the special privilege of excluding gray market goods to an international enterprise).
96. Victor, supra note 58, at 792. See also Shely, supra note 60, at 427 n.33.
97. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557.
98. Id. (Section 133.21 of the Bureau of Customs regulations provides for a blanket exclu-
sion of all gray market goods, the section then provides for numerous exceptions for related
companies. Thus, with the exceptions, only independent United States owners get blanket pro-
tection from the gray market.).
99. This monopoly is only an intrabrand monopoly. Continental, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
The domestic mark holder is the only one who can sell goods under the particular trademark.
15 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). The domestic mark holder still must compete with different brands
of the same product. Continental, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
100. Bicks, Antitrust and Trademark Protection Concepts in the Import Field, 49 TRADE-
MfiR REP. 1255, 1257 (1960).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. This monopoly, however, would only be an intrabrand monopoly. Continen-
tal, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
104. Id. See also Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557.
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passage of section 526 was to prevent fraud." 5 The second reason
for limiting protection to independent mark holders is the concern
that not allowing the domestic mark holder to take advantage of sec-
tion 526 would permit a foreign manufacturer to sell trademark rights
to an American distributor, and then turn around and flood the market
by supplying to gray market importers.' 6
In Vivitar v. United States,"7 however, the appellate court held
section 526 was not passed solely with the intent of nullifying the
appellate court in Bourjois. °8 The Vivitar court held section 526 gave
domestic mark holders the right to control the importation of all goods
bearing an identical mark regardless of the relationship between the
domestic mark holder and the foreign manufacturer.' 9 Furthermore,
the court stated that the interpretation of section 526 by Customs
restricting the use of section 526 to independent United States com-
panies was a reasonable interpretation."10 The court addressed the ap-
parent contradiction between the express language of section 526 and
the interpretation of the Bureau of Customs by stating that Congress
could not have foreseen all possibilities in international trade rela-
tionships."' The court concluded the interpretation of section 526 by
the Bureau of Customs was valid, though not controlling, with respect
to the scope of protection of section 526." 2 Therefore, the Bureau
of Customs may decide to allow the importation of gray market goods.
The decision by Customs, however, does not preclude the domestic
mark holder from bringing an action for trademark infringement." 3
Not all courts and commentators are in agreement regarding whether
section 526 should apply to domestic mark holders owned or con-
105. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 242. See also Shely, supra note 60, at 427; Bicks,
supra note 100, at 1256.
106. See Bicks, supra note 100, at 1256.
107. 761 F.2d at 1552.
108. Id. at 1561.
109. Id. at 1565.
110. Id. at 1571 (the court explained that many variations are found in the gray market.
For example, the United States and foreign trademark rights may be owned by the same entity,
or by related companies, or by wholly separate companies. The goods of the domestic mark holder
may be imported and may be identical to, or different from the gray market goods. Goods
may be produced in the United States by the domestic mark holder and different goods pro-
duced abroad by and affiliate of the domestic mark holder. Services and warranties may or
may not be the same in the United States as abroad.). See Takamatsu, Parallel Importation
of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 5 WASH. L. REv. 433 (1982) (for a discus-
sion of other variations).
I11. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
112. Id. (the court stated that regulations cannot effect the scope of a trademark owner's
rights).
113. Id.
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trolled by foreign manufacturers." 4 If the holding by the Vivitar court
is adopted as the final determination on the issue,"' domestic mark
holders who are owned or controlled by foreign manufacturers are
left without an adequate remedy." 6 Those domestic mark holders will
be forced into court to obtain a determination of trademark infringe-
ment, after which they must invoke the aid of the Bureau of Customs
to exclude the infringing imports." 7 Regardless of how the issue of
the scope of section 526 is resolved, domestic mark holders must con-
tend with the possibility of antitrust violations.
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
In 1957, in United States v. Guerlain,"8 the Justice Department
filed complaints against three United States toiletry companies charg-
ing them with invoking trademark laws to effectuate a monopoly.," 9
The defendants in Guerlain were associated closely with a French
manufacturer. 20 The defendants had been assigned certain trademark
rights in the merchandise involved in the case.' 2' The theoretical basis
for the case presented by the government was that the defendants'
use of section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham
Act to exclude genuine goods violated the antitrust provision of the
Sherman Act. 22
In order to find an antitrust violation, the court first had to find
an exploited product. Exploitation is defined as pricing which is not
affected by price changes in similar products. 23 Once a distributor
begins to exploit a relevant market,'2 4 consumers lose the benefits of
114. Compare Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565 (the court held that § 526 gave a trademark owner
the right to control imports of all goods bearing the mark regardless of the relationship be-
tween the domestic mark holder and the foreign manufacturer) with Bicks, supra note 100,
at 1256 (the sole purpose of § 526 was to prevent fraud).
115. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court. Victor, supra note 58, at 800.
116. Callmann, Federal Circuit Dodges Grey Goods Issue, 7 Bus. COMPETITION L. ADVISOR
1, 2 (4th ed. 1985).
117. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. But cf. Callmann, supra note 116, at 2. The editor criticized
the Vivitar court for not ordering Customs to bring the regulations into compliance with the
interpretation of the court. The editor explained that domestic mark holders are forced to waste
time and money to bring a lawsuit to get a determination of infringement, then invoke the
aid of Customs to exclude the goods. Id.
118. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
119. Id. at 79.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (by excluding the gray market goods, the defendants were insulating the American
market from competition).
123. Id. (for example, if another perfume company lowered its price, the manufacturer
of the exploited product still would not lose any sales).
124. See id. at 83. A relevant market is the market within which the strength of competitive
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competition and must pay an artificially high price for the product.2'25
The district court held that the trademark was exploited beyond the
scope of trademark protection, and was the most valuable aspect of
the appeal of the product.1 26 A second element of an antitrust claim
is establishment of a relevant market. 27 The Guerlain court defined
the relevant market as the separate lines of trademarked products im-
ported by the defendants. 21
After finding an exploited product and a relevant market, the
Guerlain court concluded that the defendants were exercising monopoly
power by intentionally excluding all competition.' 29 The defendants
wrongfully excluded competition by invoking section 526 of the Tariff
Act.' 30 Although prevailing on the merits, the Justice Department
moved to vacate the judgment. 3' The United States Soliciter General'32
did not believe that a company should be held in violation of the
antitrust laws when relying on the tariff laws. 33 Commentators gener-
ally agree that Guerlain provides no precedential value because of
the way the case was disposed.' 34 Furthermore, the case has been
discredited by critics because the judge who wrote the opinion merely
presumed that a relevant market existed.' 35 The judge based his find-
forces are measured. See id. The primary factor that one looks to in determining the existence
of a relevant market is the cross-elasticity of demand. Id. An element to consider in determin-
ing the cross-elasticity of a product is to look at the responsiveness of the consumer to a price
change of a similar product. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). If a slight decrease
in the price of a similar product occurs, and consumers switch to that brand, high cross-elasticity
exists. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 85.
127. Id. at 83.
128. Shely, supra note 60, at 432 (the court based the relevant market on the importance
of the trademark to the sale of perfume).
129. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 85.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Guerlain, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
132. The Solicitor General of the United States is in charge of representing the Government
in the Supreme Court. He determines the position that the Government should take on the
issues in the case. The Solicitor General's duties include deciding whether the United States
should appeal in cases it loses before the lower court. BLACK's LAW DicTIONARY 712 (5th ed.
1979).
133. The Solicitor General became sympathetic to the argument that unfairness existed when
the Justice Department prosecuted firms for antitrust violations when those firms had acted
with the continuing aid of Customs authorities. Lipner, The Legality of Parallel Imports:
Trademark, Antitrust, or Equity?, 19 TEx INT'L SCH. L. 553, 560 (1983).
134. Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 247; Shely, supra note 60, at 431.
135. Victor, supra note 58, at 801. The case is also limited because recently the Supreme
Court has upheld vertical restrictions. Continental, 433 U.S. at 54. Vertical restictions were
upheld because they increase interbrand competition. Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand com-
petition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business
of a given group of buyers. Vertical restrictions tend to promote interbrand competition by
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of the product.
Id. Guerlain is also limited because the Reagan Administration has withdrawn from many of
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ing of a relevant market on the fact that the value of the goods was
derived from their trademark.' 36 Despite the criticism of the Guerlain
decision, domestic mark holders still must contend with the possibili-
ty of antitrust violations because their activities produce an intrabrand
monopoly.' 3
7
THE LANHAm ACT
Antitrust issues involved in the gray market controversy are now
secondary to the trademark infringement issues.' 38 Since enactment
in 1946, the Lanham Act has been used by domestic mark holders
to exclude the importation of genuinely marked goods.'39 The Lanham
Act represents traditional trademark protection offered to trademark
owners.' 40 The pertinent language of the Lanham Act states that no
article of imported merchandise that copies or simulates a trademark
registered in accordance with the provisions of the act shall be ad-
mitted to the United States.' 4 '
Initially, the Lanham Act did nothing to protect domestic mark
holders. In Gretsch v. Schoening,' 2 the Second Circuit held the owner
of a United States trademark could not rely on the Lanham Act to
exclude the importation and sale of goods bearing a genuine mark
because no trademark infringement had occurred.'4 3 The primary issue
to be resolved when determining the existence of trademark infringe-
ment is whether the marks create a likelihood of confusion causing
consumers viewing a particular mark to associate the mark with an
improper source. 44 The court reasoned that genuine goods could not
mislead consumers. '4 In Bourjois v. Aldridge,'" however, the Supreme
Court overruled Gretsch and held that the Lanham Act could be in-
the old line antitrust claims on the belief that larger companies are more efficient and have
bolstered the economy. Johnson, Current Antitrust Goals and Policies: How Different are They
Really?, 27 ST. Louns U.L.J. 321, 322. (1981). See also Taylor & Crock, Reagan Team Believes
Antitrust Legislation Hurts Big Business, wall St. J., July 8, 1981, at 1, col. I.
136. Victor, supra note 58, at 810.
137. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
138. Victor, supra note 58, at 802.
139. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163; Seiko, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 560.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
141. Id.
142. 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
143. Id. at 782.
144. Callmann, Another Look at the Unlawful Importation of Trademarked Articles, 52
TRADE-MARK REP. 556, 557 (1960).
145. See Gretsch, 238 F. at 782.
146. 292 F. 1013 (1922).
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voked to exclude the importation of a genuinely marked item of mer-
chandise.' 47
The Lanham Act protects any owner of a United States trademark.'
41
In contrast, section 526 is limited to American owners of United States
trademarks. 4 Another difference between section 526 and the Lanham
Act is that the purpose behind section 526 is to prevent foreign
manufacturers from perpetrating fraud upon the United States assignee
of the foreign trademark.'3 0 In contrast, the purpose of the Lanham
Act is to prevent trademark infringement and unfair competition.' 5 '
As a consequence of the narrow scope of section 526, the protection
provided to domestic mark holders is, for the most part, inadequate.
52
In contrast, the Lanham Act squarely addresses the position taken
by the domestic mark holders. 3' Some doubt exists, however, regard-
ing whether the sale of a genuinely trademarked good is trademark.
infringement. Early courts had difficulty applying trademark protec-
tion to the gray market because gray market goods are indeed gen-
uinely marked goods. 5 4 The marketing of gray market goods does
not involve copying or simulation. " The goods come from the same
manufacturer who supplies the domestic mark holder.'
5 6
In the absence of any distinct characteristics associated with the
domestic mark holder, the rationale underlying trademark protection
does not warrant the exclusion of genuinely trademarked goods.'1
Exclusion is not warranted because consumers simply are not deceived
as to the origin of the product.' Trademark protection appears to
be warranted, however, when the owner of the United States mark
has established an independent reputation for the trademark.'59 An
independent reputation is distinguished from the trademark associated
with the foreign manufacturer. 61 With an independent reputation, the
147. Id. at 1014.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
149. Bicks, supra note 100, at 1257.
150. Id. at 1256.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
152. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
154. Gretsch, 238 F. at 782.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). Copying or simulation is the language of the statute. In
Bourjois v. AIdridge, however, the court extended the Lanham Act to gray market imports.
292 F. 1013 (1922).
156. Weil Ceramics & Glass v. Bernard Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 702 (D.N.J. 1985).
157. Callmann, supra note 144, at 557 (because one must establish consumer confusion).
158. See id.
159. An independent reputation is developed when the consumer can identify the domestic
mark holder as the source of the product even though the product carries the same mark as
the foreign manufacturer. Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 710.
160. Id.
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possibility of consumer confusion is enhanced.' 6' Again, however,
courts have split on which gray market goods are excludable from
importation when an independent reputation has been established by
the domestic mark holder. 62
RECENT CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
Gray market litigation was almost nonexistent for twenty-five years
after the Guerlain antitrust decision.' 63 In 1982, however, a camera
distributor brought suit to enjoin a gray market importer from im-
porting gray market cameras.' 64 The domestic mark holder alleged
that the gray market importer was violating both the Lanham Act
and the Tariff Act.' 65 In Bell & Howell v. Masel,166 Mamiya Camera
Co. Ltd. manufactured cameras in Japan. 67 J. Osawa & Co. owned
the exclusive rights to distribute Mamiya cameras worldwide. 68 Osawa
sold the rights to distribute the cameras in the United States to the
plaintiff Bell & Howell. 69 Significantly, Osawa owned seven percent
of Bell & Howell directly, and owned the remaining ninety-three per-
cent through a wholly owned subsidiary.' 0 Furthermore, Osawa sold
Mamiya cameras directly to the Hong Kong market.' 7' In Hong Kong,
defendant Masel Co. purchased Mamiya cameras."' Masel then im-
ported and sold the cameras in the United States through the gray
market.' The Second Circuit held consumer confusion was unlikely
because the gray market cameras were genuine Mamiya cameras.7 4
The only differences in the cameras sold by the gray market importer
were that those cameras did not have a sticker applied to their packag-
ing, and they did not carry a warranty.'75 The court did not, however,
hold that exclusion of the gray market goods based on trademark
infringement would be prohibited. 7 6 The court simply found no
161. See id.
162. Parfums, 575 F. Supp. at 416; Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 710.
163. United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
164. Bell & Howell: Mamiya v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 1066.
166. 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
167. Id. at 1065.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 46.
175. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1068.
176. See id. at 1079.
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trademark infringement because the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion was nonexistent.17 7 Less than one year after Bell & Howell, a
lawsuit involving similar facts was filed.
In Osawa v. B & H Photo,' a broad foundation was laid for
a finding of irreparable injury and consumer confusion.' 79The result
was that the federal district court ordered the gray market goods ex-
cluded from importation.' In Osawa, the foreign supplier owned
ninety-three percent of the plaintiff's stock, and owned a substantial
portion of the company which owned the remaining seven percent
of the plaintiff's stock.' 8 ' The court invoked the territoriality view'8 2
of trademark protection,' 83 and held that trademarks not only iden-
tify the product, but also the goodwill of the business.' 84 The court
focused upon the fact that the plaintiff incurred substantial advertis-
ing expense.'18  The gray market importer was able to take advantage
of that advertising.'8 6 Furthermore, the domestic mark holder had
established a separate identity from the foreign supplier.' 87 The separate
identity was established by offering various services such as warranty
coverage, rebates, seminars, and an exhaustive inventory of Mamiya
camera parts in all dealerships.' 88 Therefore, because consumers were
likely to be confused as to the origin of the gray market cameras,
the cameras were excluded from importation. 9 The plaintiff's suc-
cess in the Osawa case is attributable primarily to the amount of
evidence presented to the court concerning the likelihood of consumer
confusion. 90 In contrast, the unfavorable outcome for the plaintiff
in the Bell & Howell case was attributable primarily to the lack of
evidence concerning consumer confusion.' 91
177. Id.
178. 589 F. Supp. at 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
179. Id. at 1166 (plaintiff demonstrated the extent of costs incurred to promote the pro-
duct, and the damage plaintiff was incurring as a result of lost sales to the gray market).
180. Id. at 1179.
181. The plaintiff in this case was formerly named Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. who was
the plaintiff in Bell & Howell v. Masel Supply Co. and is now named Osawa & Co. Id. at
1165. Ninety-three percent of the plaintiff's stock is owned by Osawa & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.,
a wholly owned subsidiary of the Japanese trading company, J. Osawa Co., Ltd. The remain-
ing seven percent of the plaintiff's stock is owned by Mamiya Co. of Japan. J. Osawa Co.,
Ltd. owns 30% of Mamiya's stock. Id. See also Shely, supra note 60, at 432 n.76.
182. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
183. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171.
184. Id. 1171-74.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1174.
188. Id. at 1166.
189. See id.
190. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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In Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service,9"' the court
was not necessarily concerned with consumer confusion. 93 The federal
district court was faced with a commonly owned enterprise similar
to Osawa, but came to the opposite result.19' In Parfums, a con-
glomerate consisting of enterprises incorported under the laws of several
states and several foreign countries was owned by members of the
Milton Stern family.' 95 The entity owned the rights to manufacture,
promote, and distribute Oscar de la Renta products throughout the
world.' 96 A foreign distributor of Oscar de la Renta products sold
the genuine products to the gray market for resale in the United
States.' 97
The court held that the plaintiff was a "cog in a single interna-
tional enterprise."' 91 The court invoked the universality view,' 9 9 and
concluded that the domestic mark holder had no right to exclude the
goods from importation."'0 The court acknowledged that the plain-
tiff may have developed a separate identity and incurred advertising
expenses. 20 ' The court stated, however, that the free riding on the
plaintiff's advertising was a benefit to the public because the defend-
ant was able to offer a lower price.
202
THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT LAW
The Lanham Act has been the primary remedy for domestic mark
holders.20 3 One commentator has suggested that section 44(h) of the
Lanham Act"" offers the true solution to the gray market dilemma. 205
According to section 44(h) of the Lanham Act, any person, whether
a citizen, a domestic corporation, or a national of a foreign country,
is entitled to effective protection against unfair competition in the
form of remedies analogous to those which the Act provides against
192. 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
193. See id. at 419 (the court mentioned that the plaintiff had a separate identity through
advertisement, however, the court did not address the issue of consumer confusion).
194. Id. at 421.
195. Id. at 418.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
200. See Parfums, 575 F. Supp. at 421.
201. Id. at 419.
202. Id. at 421.
203. See supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
204. Callmann, supra note 144, at 562.
205. Id.
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trademark infringement. 06 Therefore, the remedies available under
section 42 of the Lanham Act, which protects against trademark in-
fringement, would be applicable to unfair trade practices of gray
market importers. 0 7 Determining what constitutes unfair competition,
however, has been difficult for the courts to establish." 8 In order
to determine what is unfair competition, the competing interests to
be weighed are the damage to competition caused by reduction in
the number of competitors against benefits to competition resulting
from elimination of free riding.209 The courts, however, have not for-
mulated standards to produce a predictable result as to what is un-
fair competition. 10
PROPOSALS FOR THE GRAY MARKET DILEMMA
Confusion has existed over the treatment of gray market goods since
those goods were first imported into the United States.2 , -Customs
regulations provide an inadequate solution to the problern-icaused
by gray market goods.212 In addition, the trademark protection pro-
visions of the Lanham Act do not solve the problem. Congress should
act to protect American consumers, while at the same time providing
adequate protection to domestic mark holders.
To date, most gray market litigation has involved trademark in-
fringement. 1 Much of the gray market controversy could be resolv-
ed through negotiations between the domestic mark holder and the
foreign supplier. In fact, one commentator has said that trademark
concepts are perverted when extended to protect a situation created
by private contractual arrangements.214
A strong dollar provides fertile ground for the gray market. 1 5
Therefore, the price a domestic mark holder pays for the exclusive
right to distribute a product may be high. If the parties provide for
future contract negotiations to take into account the strength of the
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 558. Callmann explains the term "unfair competition" has been loosely used
in opinions. Callmann concludes that dilution of the trademark may be a more appropriate
description of the effect on the domestic mark holder. Id.
209. Lipner, supra note 133, at 570.
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 142-202 and accompanying text.
214. Vandenberg, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a
Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707, 714 (1959).
215. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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dollar, much of the unfairness to the domestic mark holder would
be minimized."1 6 If the parties cannot agree initially on a price for
exclusive distribution rights, a provision could be placed in the con-
tract that would allow for a rebate from the foreign supplier for any
sales lost to the gray market." '7 The rebate would be financed with
profits from sales to gray market importers. Therefore, the domestic
mark holder would be compensated for watered down trademark rights
from sales to gray market importers. 218
Not all of the gray market problems can be solved by contractual
negotiations. The problems of consumer confusion and damage to
the goodwill of the domestic mark holder remain. The remedy that
is the least restrictive to all parties concerned and which is gaining
support requires the gray market importers to provide full and fair
disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the sale of gray market
goods.2" 9 In 1985, New York passed a statute requiring gray market
importers to inform their customers that the products purchased have
no relation to the domestic mark holder. 220 The notice label remedies
problems relating to consumer confusion and destruction of the
domestic mark holder's goodwill.2 2'
No consistency is found among the courts concerning gray market
importation.2 Neither gray market importers nor domestic mark
holders can operate with any predictability.2 3 Therefore, since the
courts cannot develop a consistent remedy, Congress should enact
legislation establishing consistency and predictability in the law. The
216. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
217. Theoretically, this rebate would be paid from profits from the sale to the gray market
importer. See Bicks, supra note 100, at 1260.
218. See id.
219. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
220. N.Y. GENERAL BUSINEss LAW § 218aa.
2. Every retail dealer who knowingly offers for sale gray market merchandise shall
conspicuously post, in the following manner, the information required by subdivi-
sion three of this section:
a. On a sign attached to the item itself; or
b. On a sign affixed to each cash register or point of sale at which such goods
are offered for sale; or
c. On a sign so situated as to be clearly visible to the buyer from the register.
3. Every retail dealer who offers for sale gray market merchandise shall disclose,
as applicable, that either some of the products or a specific product are not:
a. accompanied by the manufacturer's warranty valid in the United States; or
b. accompanied by instructions in English; or
c. elegible for a rebate offered by the manufacturer.
221. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 163-215 and accompanying text.
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most equitable solution to the problems created by gray market goods
is to require all gray market importers to inform their customers of
what they are actually buying and where the product came from. Fur-
thermore, gray market importers should be required to distinguish
their products on a notice label from those of the domestic mark
holder.
CONCLUSION
Importation of gray market goods into the United States is at an
all time high. While domestic mark holders have sought help from
the courts to stop alleged unfair competition by the gray market im-
porters, gray market importers have alleged that domestic mark holders
are violating antitrust laws. Courts have reached conclusions support-
ing each side of the debate. The current status of the law governing
the gray market is unclear. Section 526 of the Tariff Act can be in-
voked only by a domestic corporation and, therefore, is inadequate
to protect foreign corporations. Furthermore, the Tariff Act was
enacted originally to protect domestic mark holders against fraud,
and does not address the gray market issues of trademark infringe-
ment and unfair trade practices. The Lanham Act provides broader
coverage, but is also limited because the primary focus is trademark
infringement. The Lanham Act also addresses unfair competition. The
courts, however, have not been able to develop a sufficient standard
that gives parties to the gray market debate a reasonable ground for
predictability.
Since laws relating to gray market goods are unclear and unpredict-
able, Congress should enact legislation providing a solution to the
present dilemma. Interests of consumers, gray market importers, and
domestic mark holders must be balanced. This comment maintains
that the least restrictive and most equitable solution would be a federal
statute that parallels the notice requirement of the recently enacted
New York statute. The notice label required by the New York statute
sufficiently protects the interests of consumers. In addition, the notice
label protects the goodwill of the domestic mark holder. Therefore,
since consumers and domestic mark holders would be adequately pro-
tected with a notice label, the importation of gray market goods should
be permitted to preserve the benefits of open competition.
Scott R. Baugh
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